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Abstract  
 The purpose of this research is to test the relationship of the independent variables (commercial 
bank, mix bank, country risk, CPI, foreign lender, log amount, maturity, ticker, secure, senior, 
deal purpose, and sector industries) to the dependent variables (loan spread). Key issues in this 
study consisted of information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, and country risk. The 
results of this research show the variable that significantly affect the loan pricing decisions by 
lenders especially in Asia Pacific countries. Borrowers in Asia Pacific can learn from the lender’s 
behavior in the loan pricing decision. They also can have more knowledge on the determinants 
influence the procedure of the loan pricing. Governments of the Asia Pacific countries can use 
this study to gain more information about factors that influence the loan pricing. They should 
make a regulation according loan pricing decisions and they should monitored the process of the 
loans for the local banks so they wouldn’t be bankrupt because loans in Asia Pacific contains 
high risk. 
Keywords: asymmetry information, credit risk, loan pricing. 
JEL Classification: D82 
INTRODUCTION 
In most all country especially Indonesia, bank lending continues to be an important source 
of funding for companies. Bank loans remain the main source of external financing for 
companies in Indonesia. Seeing the large loans from banks, loan pricing that based on the 
risk assessment must be done correctly by the lenders. Indonesia that have high NPL 
(Non-performing Loans) rate raises doubts to whether lenders have indeed assessed risk 
properly, thus resulting in an appropriate loan pricing. 
Loan pricing is a critically important topic in the study of financial institutions (Swank, 
1996).There are many research about loan pricing and what is considered in the loan 
pricing, but this research is contributing on the behavior in Asia Pacific region while the 
other research is conducting the research in the developing countries such as U.S and 
Europe which are already well regulated. Researcher also focusing this study on the 
country risk effect and the other credit risk that is considered by lenders in the loan 
pricing. 
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The most substantial theories affecting variables in loan pricing decision are asymmetric 
information and moral hazard theories (Sinkey, 2002; Heffernan, 1996). In Indonesia, 
asymmetric information becomes a serious issue related to the insufficient monitoring 
system from creditor and the weakness of financial system regulation. This situation 
creates unique aspect for loan pricing research in Indonesia caused by high level of 
asymmetric information, which is different from the previous research conducted in USA 
and Europe with low level of asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information is happen when there are disparity in information between 
lenders and borrowers (Atmojo, 2004). The quantity and the quality of information that 
the borrowers had are different with the information that the lenders have. The limited 
information makes the lender unable to differentiate between high quality and low quality 
borrowers and make a mistake by charging high loan pricing for high quality borrowers, 
or vice versa, called as adverse selection caused by asymmetric information. 
Besides adverse selection, moral hazard problem is also caused by asymmetric 
information. Moral hazard is occurred when the lenders and borrowers have different 
level of information and the borrowers are taking advantages from having more 
information than the lenders. 
Country characteristics have an important role in shaping the loan pricing despite the 
availability of financial information related to borrower. This is because the risk of 
asymmetry information in the Asia Pacific countries is greater than the U.S. or Europe, 
so the lender need to assess the risks that could affect the ability of borrower to repay 
the loan. Comparing risk assessment and loan pricing by domestic lenders and foreign 
lenders are also conducted by Atmojo (2004). Atmojo (2004) explains that domestic 
lenders are in a good position to easily obtain information and more cost efficient than 
the foreign lenders. 
Atmojo (2004) also categorize corporate lending based on listed and non-listed 
borrowers. For listed borrowers which shares traded on the stock exchange, the 
information will be more easily obtained. (Booth, 1992) also explained that publicly 
owned companies will reduce a lower asymmetric information and monitoring cost, as 
well caused a lower risk, since the  borrower  maintain their transparency which results 
in a lower/cheaper loan pricing. 
For type of creditor, there are 2 kinds of banks which are commercial bank and 
investment bank. Marciano (2008) explained that commercial bank have a better 
ability to reduce asymmetric information compare to investment bank. Furthermore, 
the loan size that the lenders give to the borrower is representing the quality of the 
borrower to decide the spread given. 
In finance, maturity or maturity date refers to the final payment date of a loan or other 
financial instrument, at which point the principal (and all remaining interest) is due to 
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be paid. It represents that the riskier the company, lenders will tend to give shorter 
term maturity so they can reevaluate it, thus lenders will give high spread to cover high 
risk that the company have (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stoch and Mauer, 1996). 
Another variable that needs to be considered is whether the loan is secured with the 
collateral or not. The definition of collateral in Winton and Rajan (1995) is as a 
“specific assets pledged as security for a loan.” Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor 
(1987) stated that the borrower could have a good credit risk quality by offering a 
collateral. 
While for seniority, if the loan is senior it means it will be paid first than the 
subordinates’ loan. This suggests that senior loans will be charged lower loan spread 
by lender. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the practical world, loan pricing tend to follow prime-rate convention or cost of 
funds-plus-pricing formula, where borrowers will be given prime rate plus (or minus) 
the base or based on a markup over lenders’ cost of funds (Sinkey, 2002). Lenders 
should perform the right risk based pricing to the borrowers, because they often 
performed with their own assumption and consideration. Risk based pricing requires 
lenders to determine the interest rate that compensates the risk level of the loan 
(Atmojo, 2004). 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Lasmono and Marciano (2010) explained that the high rate of corruption perception 
index shows the common practice of bribe and misused funds in the bureaucrat, which 
could lead to borrower’s false action such as issuing a misleading financial report, 
false tax report, etc. Country with high corruption perception index indicates that the 
asymmetry information also greater, thus the lenders will enlarge the loan spread. 
H1: The higher the corruption rate will results in a higher loan spread. 
Ticker 
Listed company is monitored by the investors, public claimholders, analysts, or bond 
rating agencies all the time through cross monitoring. The situation where the 
information is easier to obtain could reduce the level of asymmetry information 
between lenders and borrowers (Marciano, 2008). Therefore, listed borrowers will 
have lower loan spread compared with non-listed borrowers (Booth, 1992). 
H2: Listed company makes lender gives lower loan spread. 
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Foreign and Domestic Lenders 
There are findings from Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney (2000) who explained that 
foreign banks will have better performance in lending to developing countries if the 
foreign bank may cooperate with the domestic banks located in that country. Atmojo 
(2004) explained that domestic lenders are in a good position to easily obtain 
information and more cost efficient than the foreign lenders. Therefore, foreign lenders 
will have higher loan spread than the domestic lenders. 
H3: Foreign lenders gives higher loan spread compare to domestic lenders. 
Commercial and Investment Bank 
The result of the research conducted by Tanjung and Marciano (2012) shows that 
investment bank has poor monitoring capabilities, so they will increase the lead share 
to get a better monitoring ability. Drucker and Puri (2003) also explained that the 
investment bank has a higher monitoring costs due to weak evaluation capability 
compare to commercial bank.  
H4: Commercial bank gives lower loan spread compare to investment bank. 
Country Risk 
Country risk is an index measuring the risk of a country that is based on credit risk and 
political risk (Tanjung, 2012). No matter how good the company's financial 
performance, it will have a high risk if the country condition is unstable (Tanjung, 
2012). This condition leads the lender to give higher loan spread to the country that 
has high country risk. 
H5: The higher the country risk will results in a higher loan spread. 
Maturity 
There are negative relationship between maturity and loan spread. The riskier the 
company, lenders will tend to give shorter term maturity so they can reevaluate it, thus 
lenders will give higher spread to cover high risk that the company have. Lasmono 
(2010) also explained that it is because a short term maturity will results in a more 
frequent due time payment extension request by the borrower,  and cause a more 
frequent monitoring activities by the lenders. 
H6: Longer maturity makes lender gives lower loan spread. 
Secured Loans 
Smith and Warner (1979) shows that secured loans need more monitoring than unsecured 
loans or loan without collateral. The existence of collateral assumed as a signal of high 
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risk loan (Harhoff and Korting, 1998). In conclusion, loan with collateral is considered 
riskier thus lender will assigned higher loan spread to the borrower. 
H7: Secured loans makes lender gives higher loan spread. 
Senior Loans 
The findings of research conducted by Tanjung and Marciano (2012) are consistent 
with research by Godlewski and Weill (2007) which stated that the existence of 
seniority would lead a lower need of lead arranger to monitor the borrower, thus the 
loan spread will be reduced. This suggests that senior loans will be charged lower loan 
spread by lender. 
H8: Senior loans makes lender gives lower loan spread. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study involves empirical research (quantitative and explanatory), because the 
main goal is to examine the relationship between measured variables. Explanatory 
research explains the causal relationship of the increasing or decreasing a factor that 
will affect the loan pricing decisions in Asia Pacific in the year 2006 – 2010. 
Data collection procedure begins with collecting all transactions data from the data of 
all loan corporations that were recorded on Dealscan LPC (Loan Pricing Corporation). 
From the data, this research sort it based on these characteristics: (1) loan contracts in 
the period 2006 – 2010 (2) loans located in the Asia Pacific region, specifically in 17 
countries, i.e. China, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Bangladesh, 
Macau, Cambodia and Laos (3) U.S. dollar denomination loans (4) loans with LIBOR 
base rate. After following the characteristics, the sample has total 886 loan 
transactions. 
This research used only two levels of measurement which is nominal and ratio level 
measurements. The OLS regression (Ordinary Least Squares) to estimate the 
determinants in loan spread with white correction method (White heteroscedasticity 
correction) for heteroscedasticity problem is conducted to test the model. 
This research uses dependent, independent, and control variables. The dependent 
variable of this research is LOAN SPREAD which is a variable that shows the pricing 
decisions factors. Nine independent variables are CPI, TICKER, LEN_FRGN, 
COMM_BANK, MIXBANK, LOGAMMOUNT, COUNTRYRISK, MATURITY, 
SECURE and SENIOR. The control variable in this study are SIC and 
DEALPURPOSE. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This research will be conducted in several groups of model, which are : (1) all sample 
loan data (2) public loan data (3) non-public loan data (4) public loan data with 
financial performance. 
Table 1 shows the results for all four models, compare to the hypotheses explained in 
the theory above. The number inside parenthesis [  ] is showing the t-Statistic value. 
Table 1. Comparison of Hypotheses and Research Results (All Models) 
VARIABLE Hypotheses 
Model 1 : 
ALL 
SAMPLE 
Model 2 : 
PUBLIC 
Model 3 : 
NON 
PUBLIC 
Model 4 : 
PUBLIC WITH 
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
    Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
COMM_BANK Negative -64.4770*** -32.2409** -123.0018*** -33.6570** 
 
  [-4.3505] [-1.9545] [-3.4945] [-1.8934] 
MIXBANK Negative -65.9912*** -46.7062*** -143.0787*** -41.0108*** 
 
  [-5.0993] [-3.2736] [-4.6705] [-2.7031] 
COUNTRYRISK Positive 14.9030*** 17.0724*** 18.0313*** 13.0256*** 
 
  [5.7165] [5.5934] [2.6778] [3.7166] 
CPI Positive 4.2061** 4.0641* 2.4685 1.7792 
 
  [2.0731] [1.7896] [0.4612] [0.7084] 
LEN_FRGN Positive -9.7603 0.5369 22.7908 1.6075 
 
  [-1.2604] [0.0642] [1.2284] [0.1758] 
LOGAMMOUNT Negative -5.6729 -13.5767* -11.0042 -1.8664 
 
  [-0.7376] [-1.5940] [-0.5969] [-0.1902] 
MATURITY Negative -0.3203*** -0.0392*** 0.2780 -0.1067 
 
  [-3.0340] [-0.2989] [1.2584] [-0.7373] 
TICKER Negative -50.5638*** ---------- ---------- ---------- 
 
  [-6.9045] ---------- ---------- ---------- 
SECURE Positive 29.2366*** 46.7265*** 14.4531 43.1417*** 
 
  [2.9842] [4.0591] [0.6998] [3.1728] 
SENIOR Negative -114.3224*** -5.0083 -413.1475*** -19.3969 
 
  [-3.2153] [-0.1358] [-3.4163] [-0.4704] 
DEALPURPOSE Positive 10.6082 7.5459 -3.0431 5.7495 
 
  [1.3331] [0.8642] [-0.1545] [0.6003] 
DEBTTOASSETS Positive ---------- ---------- ---------- 0.5031 
 
  ---------- ---------- ---------- [0.0913] 
LOGINCOME Negative ---------- ---------- ---------- -18.7793*** 
 
  ---------- ---------- ---------- [-3.8272] 
ROA Negative ---------- ---------- ---------- -30.2482 
 
  ---------- ---------- ---------- [-0.7988] 
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Test for Model 1 
The test results showed negative and significant correlation at 1% between loan spread 
with commercial bank. This shows that commercial bank lender have the tendency to 
give lower loan spread to the borrower. This happened because commercial bank has a 
better ability to reduce asymmetric information compare to investment bank that will 
lead to a cheaper loan pricing decision (Marciano, 2008). This research results is in 
accordance with the research results conducted by Tanjung and Marciano (2012) that 
conclude significant negative relationships between loan spread and commercial bank. 
Mix bank variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%.The results of 
this analysis is in accordance with the statement of Drucker and Puri (2003) which 
revealed that the investment bank has a higher monitoring costs due to weak 
evaluation capability compare to commercial bank. While Gupta, Singh, and Zebedee 
(2008) adds that universal banks are more flexible than an investment bank because 
the bank function are between investment banks and universal banks. 
Country risk variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests 
that the riskier the country, the higher the loan spread. In their book,  Jorion (2002), 
Heffernan (2008), Eaton  et al., (1894) stated that credit risk is a risk of borrower’s 
incapability to perform their duties as stated in loan agreement, which means that the 
borrower could not paid the loans because of bankruptcy, or late payment for loan’s 
interest. This findings is in accordance with the findings of Lasmono and Marciano 
(2010) who found that higher risk of loan will cause lender to require greater 
monitoring capabilities. 
CPI variable showed positive and significant correlation at 5%. This suggests that the 
higher the corruption index will lead the lender to assign higher spread because the 
lenders will try to protect themselves by increasing its monitoring capabilities. This 
finding is similar with the research done by Lasmono and Marciano (2010) which 
explained that when the level of corruption of a country is very high, then the 
asymmetry information also predicted to be greater, thus the lenders will enlarge its 
share. 
Maturity variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. This shows that 
the longer the maturity given, lender will assign lower spread because a long term 
maturity indicates that the lender didn’t need to reevaluate or re-monitoring often. 
Shorter term maturity rate will give a chance for creditor to reevaluate or re-
monitoring when the loan is due, which mean there is positive correlation between 
maturity rates with debtor’s quality (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stoch and Mauer, 
1996). If the debtor’s quality is good, it means that the risk of the company could not 
paid the loan is lower. Thus, the lender will give lower loan spread to a long term 
maturity date. 
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Ticker variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. The finding is 
consistent with the results of Denis and Mulleneaux (2000) which revealed that if the 
borrower is registered in the capital markets, it may reduce the  lenders’  monitoring 
cost. It is also supported by the findings of Booth (1992) which explained that listed 
borrowers will have lower loan spread because there are cross monitoring that 
conducted by the public claimholders, analyst, and bond rating agencies. Information 
is easier to obtain in listed company than private or non-listed company, the situation 
where the information is easier to obtain could reduce the level of asymmetry 
information between lenders and borrowers.  
Secure variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests that if 
there is a guarantee / collateral in the loan, the loan spread will be higher. The findings 
are consistent with the results from Tanjung and Marciano (2012). Berger, Udell 
(1990) also associated collateral with a riskier loans, since collateral usually are found 
in a loan transaction that need more monitoring. The existence of collateral assumed as 
a signal of high risk loan (Harhoff and Korting, 1998). Smith and Warner (1979) 
shows that secured loans need more monitoring than unsecured loans or loan without 
collateral. In conclusion, loan with collateral is considered riskier thus lender will 
assign higher loan spread to the borrower. 
Senior variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests that if 
the loan is senior, the lender will assign lower spread because the existence of 
seniority would lead a lower need of lenders to monitor the borrower (Godlewski and 
Weill, 2007). The findings are consistent with research by Tanjung and Marciano 
(2012) which showed a negative and significant correlation for seniority variable. 
Test for Model 2 
The test results showed negative and significant correlation at 5% between loan spread 
with commercial bank. This shows that commercial bank lender have the tendency to 
give lower loan spread to the borrower. This happened because commercial bank has a 
better ability to reduce asymmetric information compare to investment bank that will 
lead to a cheaper loan pricing decision (Marciano, 2008). This research results is in 
accordance with the research results conducted by Tanjung and Marciano (2012) that 
conclude significant negative relationships between loan spread and commercial bank. 
Mix bank variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. The results of 
this analysis is in accordance with the statement of Drucker and Puri (2003) which 
revealed that the investment bank has a higher monitoring costs due to weak  
evaluation capability compare to  commercial bank. While Gupta, Singh, and Zebedee 
(2008) adds that universal banks are more flexible than an investment bank because 
the bank function are between investment banks and universal banks. 
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Countryrisk variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests 
that the riskier the country, the higher the loan spread. In their book,  Jorion (2002), 
Heffernan (2008), Eaton  et al., (1894) stated that credit risk is a risk of borrower’s 
incapability to perform their duties as stated in loan agreement, which means that the 
borrower could not paid the loans because of bankruptcy, or late payment for loan’s 
interest. This findings is in accordance with the findings of Lasmono and Marciano 
(2010) who found that higher risk of  loan will  cause  lender  to  require greater 
monitoring capabilities. 
CPI variable showed positive and significant correlation at 10%. This suggests that the 
higher the corruption index will lead the lender to assign higher spread because the 
lenders will try to protect themselves by increasing its monitoring capabilities. This 
finding is similar with the research done by Lasmono and Marciano (2010) which 
explained that when the level of corruption of a country is very high, then the 
asymmetry information also predicted to be greater, thus the lenders will enlarge its 
share.  
Secure variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests that if 
there is a guarantee / collateral in the loan, the loan spread will increase. Berger, Udell 
(1990) also associated collateral with a riskier loans, since collateral usually are found 
in a loan transaction that need more monitoring. The existence of collateral assumed as 
a signal of high risk loan (Harhoff and Korting, 1998). Smith and Warner (1979) 
shows that secured loans need more monitoring than unsecured loans or loan without 
collateral. In conclusion, loan with collateral is considered riskier thus lender will 
assign higher loan spread to the borrower. 
Test for Model 3 
The test results showed negative and significant correlation at 1% between loan spread 
with commercial bank. This shows that commercial bank lender have the tendency to 
give lower loan spread to the borrower. This happened because commercial bank has a 
better ability to reduce asymmetric information compare to investment bank that will 
lead to a cheaper loan pricing decision (Marciano, 2008). This research results is in 
accordance with the research results conducted by Tanjung and Marciano (2012) that 
conclude significant negative relationships between loan spread and commercial bank. 
Mix bank variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests 
that the lender with mixed functions (commercial and investment banks) would have a 
better monitoring capability compared to omitted variable (investment bank) so  the 
spread will be decline and credit risk exposure of the overall lenders will be reduced as 
well (Tanjung and Marciano, 2012).The results of this analysis is in accordance with 
the statement of Drucker and Puri (2003) which revealed that the investment bank has 
a higher monitoring costs due to weak  evaluation capability compare to  commercial 
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bank. While Gupta, Singh, and Zebedee (2008) adds that universal banks are more 
flexible than an investment bank because the bank functions are between investment 
banks and universal banks. 
Country risk variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests 
that the riskier the country, the higher the loan spread. In their book,  Jorion (2002), 
Heffernan (2008), Eaton  et al., (1894) stated that credit risk is a risk of borrower’s 
incapability to perform their duties as stated in loan agreement, which means that the 
borrower could not paid the loans because of bankruptcy, or late payment for loan’s 
interest. This findings is in accordance with the findings of Lasmono and Marciano 
(2010) who found that higher risk of loan will cause  lender  to  require greater 
monitoring capabilities. 
Senior variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests that if 
the loan is senior, the lender will assign lower spread because the existence of 
seniority would lead a lower need of lenders to monitor the borrower (Godlewski and 
Weill, 2007). The findings are consistent with research by Tanjung and Marciano 
(2012) which showed a negative and significant correlation for seniority variable. 
Test for Model 4 
The test results showed negative and significant correlation at 5% between loan spread 
with commercial bank. This happened because commercial bank has a better ability to 
reduce asymmetric information compare to investment bank that will lead to a cheaper 
loan pricing decision (Marciano, 2008). This research results is in accordance with the 
research results conducted by Tanjung and Marciano (2012) that conclude significant 
negative relationships between loan spread and commercial bank. 
Mix bank variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. The results of 
this analysis is in accordance with the statement of Drucker and Puri (2003) which 
revealed that the investment bank has a higher monitoring costs due to weak  
evaluation capability compare to  commercial bank. While Gupta, Singh, and Zebedee 
(2008) adds that universal banks are more flexible than an investment bank because 
the bank function are between investment banks and universal banks. 
Country risk variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests 
that the riskier the country, the higher the loan spread. In their book,  Jorion (2002), 
Heffernan (2008), Eaton  et al., (1894) stated that credit risk is a risk of borrower’s 
incapability to perform their duties as stated in loan agreement, which means that the 
borrower could not paid the loans because of bankruptcy, or late payment for loan’s 
interest. This findings is in accordance with the findings of Lasmono and Marciano 
(2010) who found that higher risk of loan will  cause  lender  to  require greater 
monitoring capabilities. 
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Secure variable showed positive and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests that if 
there is a guarantee / collateral in the loan, the loan spread will increase. Berger, Udell 
(1990) also associated collateral with a riskier loans, since collateral usually are found 
in a loan transaction that need more monitoring. The existence of collateral assumed as 
a signal of high risk loan (Harhoff and Korting, 1998). Smith and Warner (1979) 
shows that secured loans need more monitoring than unsecured loans or loan without 
collateral. In conclusion, loan with collateral is considered riskier thus lender will 
assign higher loan spread to the borrower. 
Senior variable showed negative but not significant correlation. This suggests that 
whether the borrower’s company is senior or not, it would not affect the amount of 
spread given to the borrower. The negative correlation shows that if the loan is senior, 
the lender will assign lower spread because the existence of seniority would lead a 
lower need of lenders to monitor the borrower (Godlewski and Weill, 2007). Besides 
that, the results is not significant because the data is grouped in different specification, 
so for public with financial performance testing tend to have a more dominant data on 
dummy 1 (senior loans). 
Deal purpose variable showed positive but not significant correlation. This suggests 
that the purpose of refinancing did not have much differences with other purposes. 
This happened because the purpose of debt refinancing could indicate the possibility 
that the borrowers have certain debt obligations and that they are not able to pay out of 
their own cash flows, so they have to use another loans to cover it. Therefore, debt 
refinancing purposes have higher risk than the other purposes. Because of this reason, 
lenders will give higher spread to debt refinancing loan purpose (Limtiono, 2013). The 
results are not significant because of the exaggerating response from the lenders who 
consider the difference of motives from borrowers for refinancing purpose. Besides 
that, the results is not significant because the data is grouped in different specification, 
so for all sample testing tend to have a more dominant data on dummy 0 (non-
refinancing purpose). 
Debt to assets and ROA variable showed not significant correlation. This suggests that 
financial variables did not affect the amount of spread given to the borrower. This 
happened because the lenders in public subsample with financial performance tend to 
not able to distinguish between low risks listed borrowers and high risk listed 
borrowers. Atmojo (2004) explains that the testing results for public (listed borrowers) 
subsample by adding the general financial variables shows that financial ratio is not a 
relevant factor in the risk measurement of loan. 
Log income variable showed negative and significant correlation at 1%. This suggests that 
the higher the income of a company will lead to a lower spread. This happened because 
high income indicates that the company has a good financial performance. This findings is 
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similar with the results of Tanjung and Marciano (2012) which explains that the better the 
financial performance of the company will push the lenders to lose its lead share, because 
good  financial  performance  lead to a lower default risk, so  lenders may reduce the 
monitoring cost too. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The purpose of this research is to know the relationship of the independent variables 
(commercial bank, mix bank, country risk, CPI, foreign lender, log amount, maturity, 
ticker, secure, senior, deal purpose, and sector industries) to the dependent variables (loan 
spread).Based on the test with four models, it is concluded that some significant factors 
are the type of creditor, the country risk, the corruption perception index, maturity, the 
borrower’s companies whether they are listed or not, seniority and whether their loan is 
secured or not. 
For further research, it is suggested to add some other variables that affect the loan pricing 
decisions. Researcher also suggests to make the period longer and observe more samples 
from different countries outside the Asia Pacific region. 
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